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This paper is an attempt to study the regulatory environment in the 
electricity sector of Pakistan. NEPRA, a regulatory authority was formed in 
1997 to protect consumer interests in the area of electricity provision, and to 
ensure an efficient and competitive environment for the electricity generators 
and distributors, but it has so far not been able to achieve anything. The power 
sector (dominated by WAPDA and KESC) is still affected by institutional and 
organisational weaknesses, with inefficient and non-optimal tariffs, high line 
losses, and high level of corruption. It has been found weak administrative 
governance in NEPRA in the form of lack of autonomy, resulting in the overall 
institutional inability to carry out the desired functions effectively. In addition, 
NEPRA is lacked in professional expertise to supervise and control the power 
sector and establish a rational and equitable pricing regime. 
JEL classification:  G38, L33, L43, L51, Q48  
Keywords:  Electricity, NEPRA, Pakistan, Reforms, Regulation  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
“..the key resource of government is the power to coerce. Regulation 
is the use of this power for the purpose of restricting the decisions of 
economic agents”   
[Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon (2005), p. 357] 
Regulation is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan.  Pakistan’s economy 
has always been a mixed market economy, where private sector activities have 
been regulated throughout. These regulations were in the form of various types 
of controls and regulations on entry and exit, prices, credit, foreign exchange, 
imports, investments etc. These regulations were aimed at securing national 
interests. [Kemal, et al. (2002)].   
The electricity sector in Pakistan in the post-1958 period is dominated by 
two vertically integrated publicly owned utilities, Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA) and Karachi Electric Supply Corporation 
(KESC) (Government  being the operator as well as the regulator). The 
performance of these two remained satisfactory until the early 1980s. 
Afterwards the situation started deteriorating. Severe constraints in the 
availability of capital led to inadequate generation capacity and transmission 
infrastructure. Power supply lagged behind demand resulting in excessive 
shortage of electricity especially for the industrial and commercial consumers.
1 
The economy, in general, and the manufacturing sector in particular, were 
adversely affected. The estimates of the economic loss of one kWh of power to 
the economy were between five to ten times the generation costs of one kWh of 
electric power [NEPRA Annual Report (2000-2001)].  
Massive deterioration in governance and heavy losses in WAPDA and 
KESC, created the need for restructuring. It was realised that power generation 
and transmission capacity expansion and efficiency could only be achieved with 
the involvement of the private sector. The government in 1992 prepared the 
strategic plan for the privatisation of the power sector. It also approved the 
creation of an autonomous regulatory agency, National Electric Power 
Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) to introduce transparent and judicious economic 
regulation in the sector. NEPRA came into existence in December 1997. 
However, the situation so far has barely changed. WAPDA and KESC are still 
facing institutional and organisational weaknesses. The combined direct and 
                                                 
Acknowledgements:  The author is grateful to Dr Nadeem Ul Haque, Mir Annice Mahmood 
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omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author.  
1Load shedding of up to 30 percent of peak demand.   
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indirect losses incurred by these utilities during the period 1996-to date have 
created large fiscal deficits, being covered though taxpayers money and through 
borrowings [Kemal,  et al. (2002)]. What NEPRA, as an independent 
organisation has done so far needs to be analysed given the fact,  
“Effective governments are needed to build the legal, institutional and 
regulatory framework without which market reforms can go badly wrong, at 
great cost– particularly for the poor”.  [DFID (2000), p. 23-25]
2 
This suggestion supported by a great body of empirical evidence 
confirmed that quality of the regulatory environment has a significant impact on 
the overall performance of the sector as well as economic growth [Zhang, et al. 
(2002); Cubbin and Stern (2006); Jalilian, et al. (2003)].  
The quality of a regulatory agency is determined primarily by the quality 
of its governance. Many attributes of good regulation have been identified in the 
economic literature,  for example, regulatory autonomy, accountability, 
transparency, participation, predictability and clarity of functions [Levy and 
Spiller (1994); Stern (2000); Stern and Holder (1999); Smith (1997) and Jacobs 
(2004)]. 
This paper intends to revisit and analyse the governance attributes with 
reference to NEPRA to find out to some extent the reasons behind the poor 
performance of the sector. The performance of the new regulatory setup (with 
their own particular economic and social problems and instrumental 
characteristics) remains under-researched in the context of developing countries, 
in general, and Pakistan, in particular. This paper is an attempt to contribute to 
that research while studying the regulatory environment in the electricity sector 
of Pakistan.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Introduction is followed by the 
review of literature. This section will reflect on the two dimensions of 
regulation, rationale behind regulating electricity and a review of empirical 
literature.   The second section will review in detail power sector reform and 
regulatory framework in Pakistan. In the third section, governance 
characteristics associated with an efficient regulatory authority will be 
discussed. This section will try to analyse  critically the working of NEPRA. 
Finally, the fifth section will conclude the discussion. 
 
2. THEORY OF REGULATION AND IMPORTANCE  
OF REGULATING UTILITIES 
This section will briefly reflect on the theory and conceptual issues in 
regulation as discussed in the literature. It  will also review the empirical 
literature to highlight the issues involved in regulating utilities and the 
regulatory reform experience of some of the countries in the electricity sector.  
                                                 
2Statement is cited from Kirkpatrick and Parker (2004).  
 
3 
2.1. Economic Theory of Regulation 
The evolution of the theory of e conomic regulation dates back to the 
nineteen century, when Adam Smith regarded market failure as the motivating 
reason for the entry of regulation. There are three stages of this evolution 
outlined in the literature [Peltzman (1989); and Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon 
(2005)]. These are:  
• The first theory was that regulation occurs in industries plagued with 
market failures, originally public interest theory, recently referred to as 
normative analysis as a  positive theory (NPT).  
• Given the inconsistency in the empirical literature with this theory, the 
economists and the political scientists developed the  capture theory 
(CT). It states, whether by design or not, the agency that is meant to 
regulate an industry is ‘captured’ by that industry. The implication is 
that regulation promotes industry profit rather than social welfare.  
• The third stage in the evolution of thought is the economic theory of 
regulation (ET).  
According to Peltzman (1989) the first two were empirical generalisations 
without a theoretical foundation. The third stage ET filled that theoretical gap. It 
was in 1971, when Nobel laureate George Stigler, in the pioneering article “The 
Theory of Economic Regulation”, states that the basic resource of the state is ‘the 
power to coerce’. An ‘interest group’ that can convince the state to use its power 
of coercion to that interest group’s benefit can improve its well-being. In other 
words, it is like a supply-demand schedule, where regulation is supplied to meet 
the demand of interest groups, to m aximise their income. Regulation is an 
opportunity for an interest group to increase its income, whereby state redistributes 
wealth from other parts of society to that interest group.  
“we assume that political systems are rationally devised and rationally 
employed, which is to say that they are appropriate instruments for the 
fulfilment of desires of members of the society”.  [Stigler (1971), pp. 4] 
The paper by Peltzman (1976) further supported Stigler’s analysis. There 
are three important aspects of Stigler and Peltzman work (observed in practice). 
First, regulatory legislation redistributes wealth among members of the society. 
Second, the behaviour of legislators is driven by their desire to remain in office, 
implying that legislation is designed to maximise political support. Third, 
interest groups compete by offering political support in exchange for favourable 
legislation. As a consequence, regulation is likely to be biased towards interest 
groups that are relatively small and better organised (so that they are more 
effective at acquiring political support) and gain more from favourable 
legislation, at the cost of weakly organised large interest groups [Viscusi, 
Harrington, and Vernon (2005)].    
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The economics of regulation literature [e.g., Averch and Johnson (1962) 
and Baily (1973)] has also highlighted the situations where there are regulatory 
failures, where the regulation of markets might reduce rather than increase 
economic welfare [cited from Kirkpatrick and Parker (2004)]. 
 
2.1.1. Market Failures 
There are few cases of market failures generally identified in the 
literature, these are: significant externalities, public goods, merit and demerit 
goods, incomplete or asymmetric information, incomplete markets, 
monopoly, and inequality. These market failures are behind the economic 
rationale for state regulation of market economies. In public utilities, where 
there are economies of scale and scope, and monopoly exploitation, there is a 
need for state intervention.  
 
2.1.2.  State Failures 
However, the ex perience of state intervention strongly suggests the 
presence of ‘state failure’ along with the ‘market failure’. The case for market 
liberalisation and privatisation is based on the poor record of government 
intervention in market economies over the years. The argument for 
privatisation and liberalisation is supported by ‘Austrian’, ‘property rights’ 
and ‘public choice’ theories [Kirzner (1997); Demsetz (1967); Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962) and Niskanen (1968)]. The presumption behind privatisation and 
liberalisation is that it will encourage competition. Parker (2002) states in the 
presence of competitive markets a ‘pareto optimal’ solution exists, where no 
further redistribution of resources will raise economic welfare. However, in 
some sectors like utilities where there is insignificant increase in competition, 
then some form of sector regulation would substitute for it [Cook, Kirkpatrick, 
Minogue, and Parker (2004)]. 
Parker and Kirkpatrick (2002) extracted following propositions from the 
economics of regulation literature that highlight the importance of institutional 
setting, regulatory rules and the regulatory process in the context of developing 
countries.  
• The institutional context is critical to the process and outcomes of a 
regulatory regime.  
• Regulation is associated with information asymmetries. 
• Investment in a regulated environment is subject to threat of hold up 
leading to under investment. 
• Regulatory regimes are prone to regulatory and political capture. 
• A Regulatory system should be both effective and efficient. 
• Competition is superior to sate regulation and should be preferred.  
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2.2.  Why Regulate Electricity? 
Electricity (or power) supply industry has been viewed as an activity with 
natural monopoly characteristics. These monopoly characteristics result from the 
existence of economies of scale and scope.
3   Therefore, it can best be provided 
by vertically integrated monopolies owned by government. However, in the last 
two decades, the concept of ‘natural monopoly’ has been rejected in electricity 
generation and supply and these parts of the supply chain have been opened up 
for competition (with both private and public operators) [Zhang, et al. (2002)]. 
The economic and technological developments have enhanced the potential for 
competition in generation by reducing the minimum efficient scale.
4  
Regulations are thus being justified for the correction of power or information 
asymmetries and for facilitating market transition [Cordova-Novion and Halon 
(2003)]. According to Teplitz-Sembitzky (1990), the rationale for power sector 
regulation lies in the need to substitute for the role markets are unable to play. In 
response to the potentially adverse consequences of market imperfections, 
regulations: should ensure an efficient industry structure; should control power 
suppliers from exploiting their market position; and to provide suppliers with 
incentives to perform efficiently along a least-cost expansion path.  
 
 
2.3. Effectiveness of Regulation 
There are basically two dimensions of any regulatory system: regulatory 
governance and regulatory substance. Governance refers to the institutional 
and legal design of the regulatory system. It is the framework within which 
regulatory decisions are made while regulatory substance refers to the content of 
regulation, that is, regulatory functions (setting of prices, quality-of-service, and 
entry-exit rules etc.). The quality of a regulatory agency (in other words 
                                                 
3Ghafoor and Weiss (1999) empirically find economies of scale in the case of Pakistan 
electric power sector.    
4The development of low capital cost combined cycle gas powered generators have led to a 
dramatic reduction in the economies of scale in generation and supply of electricity. 
Box. 1. 
Technical Issues in Electricity 
There are few technical issues associated with electricity e.g., the physical 
flows or supply of electricity must respond  immediately to unanticipated 
changes in demand; secondly, it is not economically possible to have competing 
networks (as in telecommunications); and third electricity cannot be stored 
(unlike natural gas). In addition to these issues, its highly inelastic demand and 
captive market give way for regulations in the form of economic signals to 
ensure continued and efficient network operation and pricing.   
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effectiveness of regulation) is determined largely by the quality of its 
governance.  
  Cook,  et al. (2004) argued that state regulation is unlikely to gain 
legitimacy, unless regulatory institutions despite criticism are accepted in 
society for certain decisions or behaviour. They have identified five 
attributes of good regulation: transparency, accountability, targeting, 
proportionality, and consistency. Cordova-Novion and Hanlon (2003) 
examined some of the issues in relation to the institutional framework for 
economic regulation, particularly in the infrastructure network industries. 
They highlight the importance of independent economic regulatory 
institutions for the network industries; regulatory accountability in terms of 
its balancing effect on independence; and institutional coherence in the 
design of the regulatory framework. The importance of an independent 
regulatory institution, with a clearly defined legal framework for the 
sustained output growth and efficiency in the utility services is also 
emphasised by Stern and Cubbin (2005).  
In brief, the economic literature [Levy and Spiller (1994); Stern (2000); 
Stern and Holder (1999); Smith (1997) and Jacobs (2004)] has identified various 
governance characteristics for effective utility regulation. These include: 
regulatory autonomy, accountability, transparency, participation, 
predictability and clarity of functions. 
The following section will briefly point out the regulatory experience in 
some of the countries in the utilities with reference to the effective regulatory 
system.   
 
2.4. Regulatory Experience 
There is a vast body of literature on the economics of regulation. But here 
the focus is only on those studies that deal with new regulatory structures; and 
those that highlight issues associated with independent regulators in the utilities 
(electricity). The experience of economic reforms is not very encouraging in the 
developing countries. Most of the studies [Appendix A (Table 1)] have 
emphasised  
• the importance of strong institutions and regulatory quality; Reasons 
cited for poor performance in the developing countries being;  
• the weak legislations and poor implementation of rules and regulations;  
• large enterprises still enjoying the economic powers;  
• resources allocated to regulation are low;  
• access to information is the key for better regulation, is also poor in 
developing countries; and 
• weakness in public policy (governments lacked the co-ordination and 
planning capacities).  
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In brief, regulatory reform process is a complex task. The countries 
that have been successful have adopted the path of quick and well-planned 
transition and have strong institutional base and more significantly, the will 
to do.  
“Electricity restructuring…is likely to involve both costs and 
benefits. If the restructuring is done right…the benefits…can significantly 
outweigh the costs. But the jury is still out on whether policymakers have 
the will to implement the necessary reforms effectively”.   
[Jaskow (1997), p. 136] 
Followed by these brief findings from the review of literature, this study 
in following sections is going to review the regulatory reform process in the 
electricity sector of Pakistan. It will reflect on both the dimensions of 
regulations with reference to NEPRA (National Electric Power Regulatory 
Authority). 
 
3. PAKISTAN’S POWER SECTOR REFORM AND  
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
 
3.1. Structure  
The power sector in Pakistan is a mix of hydel and thermal units 
dominated by two vertically integrated (in generation, transmission and 
distribution) public sector utilities, WAPDA and KESC. In addition, there are 
two nuclear power plants KANUPP and CHANUPP, and a number of 
independent power producers (IPPs) and small power producers (SPPs) 
established since 1994 in the power-generating sector.  In 2005-06 the total 
installed capacity in the country is 19439 MW.  
Besides these utilities, there are f ive central government agencies with 
responsibilities in the power sector [Appendix B (Table 1)]. Provincial 
governments are responsible for hydropower projects of up to 50MW. 
 
Table 1 
Share by Operator 
  Share in Total Capacity 
WAPDA  59 % (57% hydel and 43% thermal) 
KESC  9% (thermal) 
IPPs  30% (thermal) 
Nuclear  2%  
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3.2. Reforms in the Power Sector 
The government in 1992 prepared a strategic plan for restructuring the 
electricity sector. It was realised that power generation and transmission 
capacity expansion and efficiency could only be achieved with the involvement 
of the private sector. In 1994, the government formulated a power policy and 
invited for the first time, independent power producers (IPPs) to invest in the 
generation part of the power sector
5 [details Box 2]. The structural adjustment 
programme under the supervision of IMF and WB later enhanced this policy 
shift.  
Other steps taken as apart of the reform process includes: 
• Establishment of an autonomous regulatory agency, to introduce 
transparent and judicious economic regulation in the power sector of 
Pakistan. National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) was 
created under the NEPRA Act 1997 to ensure fair competition and 
consumer, producer and seller protection. 
• Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB) was established in 1994, 
to facilitate private investors.  
• Unbundling of WAPDA’s vertically integrated Power Wing into 
separate generation, transmission, and distribution companies (as in the 
1997 NEPRA Act and the 1998 WAPDA Act) in 1998. WAPDA has 
now been reorganised into four thermal generation companies called 
GENCOs, nine distribution companies called DISCOs, and one 
National Transmission and Dispatch Company (NTDC). The 
hydroelectric power development and operation functions remain with 
WAPDA.  
• Pakistan Electric Power Company Private Limited (PEPCO) a separate 
agency within WAPDA is made responsible for the restructuring and 
preparation for privatisation for the generation and distribution 
companies in due course through the Privatisation Commission. Private 
sector participation is being encouraged to promote competition in the 
generation and distribution parts of the industry, while, NTDC would 
remain under state control and be responsible for national dispatch, 
transmission, and system planning as a ‘single buyer’.  
• Responsibility for the energy sector policy remains with the 
government.  
                                                 
5It was in 1986, GOP encouraged private sector on BOO (built-own-operate) basis but the 
response was not encouraging. GOP then later in 1994, announced a comprehensive policy package. 





The process of separating out various entities and corporatisation is in 
progress. While unbundling has been completed, the various entities created 
from WAPDA still lack independence from WAPDA and from one another. The 
distribution companies are still financially integrated with WAPDA, lack the 
technical skills to operate independently, do not have notified tariffs and have 
managers that are WAPDA employees [Parish (2006)].  
The restructuring aimed at introducing private capital, liberalising 
markets and introducing new regulatory institutions assumed that the private 
sector can more efficiently adapt to technological developments in the sector 
and have the ability to supply electricity at low prices especially to those with 
low demand through innovative customer services [Bacon and Besant-Jones 
(2002)]. However, in Pakistan the overall performance of the power sector and 
its institutions in the last 15 years has been moderate [for details see Appendix 
C]. The governance problems as well as institutional and organisational 
weaknesses in the power sector still persist. Restructuring (or unbundling), 
corporatisation, and privatisation are going on but very slowly. Technical 
transmission and distribution losses have continued and in the case of KESC, 
grown over the past decade, financial results have also been disappointing. 
According to Fraser (2004), until the ex pected efficiency improvements is 
achieved fresh private capital in the power sector in general, and for new 
generating capacity in particular, is not possible. In addition, the quality of the 
regulatory environment is very important for the investor’s confidence. Investor 
reservations about the quality of the regulatory environment, have contributed to 
a shortfall in private investment in the utilities sector in Asia [Jacobs (2004)].  
Box 2. 
IPPs in Pakistan 
As a result of attractive government incentives and generous tariff 
offers 19 IPPs started their operations in Pakistan. They brought over $3 
billion to install about 3500 MW capacity. These IPPs were allowed to sell 
electricity to both WAPDA and KESC under power purchasing agreements 
(PPAs).  Hub Power Plant (HUBCO) was the first one to start its operation 
in 1993, with a capacity of 1292 MW and a negotiated tariff based on a “cost 
plus” approach.  From 1998 onwards, Pakistan had excess capacity, as 
WAPDA and KESC were restricted to purchase expensive IPPs electricity 
while their own plants were underutilised. Financial problems instead of 
improving deteriorated even further.  IPPs get involved in disputes and 
litigation with the government over the rates set in their PPAs with WAPDA. 
In response to the Governments demand for a rate reduction, IPPs demanded 
that prices for fuels be lowered.   The government now has resolved the IPP 
issue with the involvement of international donors and within the framework 
of contractual agreements [Shah (2002) and Parish (2006)].   
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For the successful implementation of economic reforms the empirical 
literature has suggested for an efficient and strong regulatory institution. 
NEPRA, an autonomous regulatory authority was established in 1997 to regulate 
the affairs of the sector. The following subsection will review the regulatory 
framework in the power sector, reflecting basically on the content of regulation.  
 
3.3. Regulatory Framework  
The objective behind the formation of NEPRA formed by an act of 
parliament in 1997 (NEPRA Act No. XL of 1997) was to have an independent 
regulatory body to improve the efficiency and availability of electric power 
services while protecting the interests of consumers, investors and the operators 
equally, and to promote competition and deregulate power sector activities 
where competition exists.  
Initially NEPRA was established as an autonomous body without any 
administrative control from the government. However, for the sake of 
interaction with Federal and Provincial Governments it was initially attached to 
the Ministry of Water and Power. Later it was linked with the government 
through the Ministry of Law and Justice. However, in June 2000 NEPRA was 
directly attached with the Cabinet Division. Currently, NEPRA is working in an 
extremely centralised manner. All the decisions regarding tariffs and standards 
need to be approved by the government. It consists of a Chairman and four 
members (one from each province), all appointed by the government.  
The initial funding of NEPRA was provided through a grant from the 
Federal Government amounting to Rs 100.5 Million. In addition, NEPRA is 
expected to meet its expenses from licensing fees on constant basis and filling 
fees for tariff applications etc. 
Just like any regulatory system, the most important regulatory functions 
of NEPRA are grouped in the following five main categories [details in 
Appendix D]: 
• Determination of tariff rates and terms and conditions; 
• Grant of licenses, approval of power acquisition programmes; 
• Setting and enforcement of quality-of-service standards, approval of 
operating codes and investment standards;  
• Industry structure/privatisation  including the transition towards a 
competitive market where feasible; and  
• Consumer rights and obligations, complaint redressal. 
NEPRA’s broad policy guidelines for power sector reforms revolves 
around: 
• Tariff structure to ensure  sufficient resources to cover costs and 
investment in the short term;   
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• Encourage generation, transmission and distribution capacities on a 
non-discriminatory basis to meet the existing needs and growing 
demand in the long run; and  
• Quality of service to the consumers as well as ensuring network 
efficiency including reliability and voltage disturbances.  
 
3.3.1.  Licenses (Entry and Exit Requirement)  
The license provides a road map for the various transitional phases for the 
eventual goal of an open electric power  market structure.  No company is 
allowed to carry out business of generation, transmission and distribution 
without getting a license from NEPRA. It is an instrument to check the 
development of capacity more than required; to evaluate the professional ability 
of an operator to execute the project; and the financial viability of the project. 
The process involves a public hearing.  
 
Table 2 
Progress in the Issuance of Licenses 
Type of  Company  Number  Capacity 
Small Power Producers (SPPs)  25  400 MW 
Isolated Generation Companies (IGCs)  6  52 MW 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs)
6  18  4774 MW
7 
Distribution Licenses
8  9  – 
KANUPP and CHANUPP (nuclear)     
KESC and WAPDA Generation Companies   All   
Transmission License (NTDC)  1   
 
3.3.2.  Tariffs 
Tariffs or electricity pricing is an important regulatory component. 
NEPRA determines tariffs as prescribed in Tariff Standards and Procedures 
Rules (1998), keeping in view the principle to cover costs and reward 
investments as applicable on a case to case basis [for details see Appendix E].  
                                                 
6Although IPPs contracts were backed by sovereign guarantees by the government, but they 
were carrying out their business with WAPDA/NTDC without any license. Now NEPRA has 
completed the process of granting licenses to all IPPs set up in response to 1994 power policy. 
7HUBCO being at the top with the capacity of 1292 MW. 
8All successor distribution companies namely, HESCO, QESCO, MEPCO, FESCO, 





Since March 2001, an Automatic Tariff Adjustment (ATA) mechanism 
for fuel cost variations has been adopted, and applied every three months, i.e., 
adjusting consumer end tariff of the distribution companies in order to account 
for variations in the price of fuel. The idea is to capture the volatility of fuel 
price variations
9.  
NEPRA has decided the generation tariff for SPPs. Generation tariff to 
the three generation companies unbundled from WAPDA has been granted after 
approval from the government. NEPRA also granted NTDC with their use of 
system charge tariff and approved a list of generation companies selling 
electricity to the Central Power Purchase Agency (CPPA) for onward sale to the 
DISCOs according to their respective demands.  Hydel tariff for WAPDAs 




Structural Adjustment of Tariff: The ATA for ex-WAPDA distribution 
companies was stopped from December 2003 as all distribution companies have 
applied separately for their tariffs. Detailed determinations of tariff review 
motions filed by the 8 DISCOs were issued in November 2004. As per the 
requirements in the determinations a mid year review of the tariff was conducted 
and tariff adjustments were made in February 2005. The increase in tariffs for 
                                                 
9Since March 2001 to August 2004, NEPRA has given determinations on 11 WAPDA 
related tariff petitions and thirteen KESC related tariff petitions. In the next year until May 2005, 21 
ATA determinations for tariff adjustments were issued for the ex-WAPDA generation companies. 
Box 4. 
Average End User Tariff 
The average end user tariff in Pakistan for fiscal year 2005 is estimated be 
around 3.93 Rs/KWh. It involves significant cross subsidies, from industrial and 
commercial consumers to agricultural and small (under 50 kWh per month) 
domestic consumers. Tariff structure is consistent throughout the country but is 
(besides cross subsidies) divided by consumption levels (tariff slabs); and for 
industrial consumers, it is divided into peak and off-peak charges. 
Box 3. 
Tariff Structure Pakistan 
The current tariff structure is based on rate of return or cost of 
service. It determines prices charged so as to achieve revenues that cover all 
legitimate operating and capital costs while providing the firm with a fair 
rate of return on its capital employed. This fair rate of return is related to the 
cost of capital and is similar to delivering the economist’s normal profit.    
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IESCO, FESCO, LESCO, MEPCO, GEPCO, PESCO, HESCO and QESCO in 
Ps/kWh was 13.25, 12.22, 8.98, 10.32, 15.15, 11.81, 5.95, and 12.99 
respectively. However, this is still waiting for government notification.  
NEPRA and the government (including the PPIB) are currently in dispute 
over various tariff issues. WAPDA and KESC have also not been happy with 
NEPRA in respect of tariff determinations [Chaudhry (2002)]. This is a very 
serious issue given the state of our power sector. This may put future investment 
at risk in the generation projects and the sale of distribution companies. Pricing 
is the most important aspect of regulation. NEPRA has to resolve tariff disputes 
in such a manner that will attract investment but not at the cost of the 
consumers. An independent, light handed, non-discriminatory regulator is 
absolutely critical to the future success of the power sector [Parish (2006)]. But 
what if the powers or authority of the regulator has been curtailed with time.
10   
NEPRA has the credit to establish for the first time in South Asia a CPI-X 
based multi-year tariff (MYT) regulatory framework. In 2002, NEPRA 
approved a framework of multi-year tariff for KESC, for seven years from its 
privatisation (in view of its expected privatisation in the near future).
11 
Secondly, in June 2004, NEPRA approved a CPI-X based MYT framework with 
an initial duration of five years for FSECO, in view of its expected privatisation. 
A multi year tariff has also been determined for JPC.
12  This new framework is a 
radical shift from the rate of return regulation regime to performance based 
regulation in the power sector of Pakistan [Raza (2003, 2004)]. 
Some of the amendments made in the tariff rate structure a re: cross 
subsidies have been reduced
13 by increasing the rates of subsidised classes; flat 
rates have been abolished; consumer bills have been simplified to include all the 
surcharges and additional surcharges in the overall rates in such a manner that 
only fixed and energy charges are reflected in consumer bills; consumers have 
been protected from frequent price variation by allowing only quarterly 
adjustment for fuel price adjustment; and unjustified demands of the utility such 
as charging on the basis of connected load and increase of rates to cover for 
inefficiencies has not been allowed.  
However, in the existing tariff regime there is no clear coordination 
between the end user tariff set by NEPRA and the unregulated price charged by 
NTDC for electricity purchases; and secondly, the current end-user tariffs for 
some customer categories (domestic consumers with largest share in 
consumption) are inadequate for cost recovery [IFC (2006)]. Tariff structure is 
                                                 
10Recently, PPIB notified in the newspaper that the tariff determination will no more be the 
job of NEPRA. 
11Multiyear tariff is a CPI-X (consumer price index with an efficiency factor) price cap on 
controllable costs while uncontrollable costs are considered as pass through for the KESC. 
12JPC is Jamshoro Power Company, one of the three companies evolved from the thermal 
generation part of WAPDA. 
13NEPRA expects to abolish it completely.  
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not based on regional and consumer-specific long-run marginal cost but is used 
as an instrument to achieve political and socio-economic objectives.
14  
 
3.3.3.  Quality of Service 
The authority, according to section 7(2), clause c and section 34 of 
NEPRA Act (XL of 1997), is obliged to prescribe performance standards for 
generation, transmission, and distribution companies to encourage safe, reliable, 
service. The service providers not following the prescribed standards are to be 
fined. The process is quite slow. The Performance Standards (distribution) 
Rules, proposed by the authority, have been approved by the federal government 
and notified in the official gazette in January 2005. While the performance 
standards for transmission have been finalised, in the document titled 
Performance Standards (transmission) Rules 2005, on April 19, 2005, it is still 
waiting for its approval from the government. While the performance standards 
for the generation companies are yet to be drafted and are expected to be 
finalised by August 2006 [NEPRA Annual Report (2004-05)].  
NEPRA has not prescribed environmental standards, all the generation 
companies granted license by NEPRA are required to maintain environmental 
standards as may be prescribed by the Federal Environmental Protection 
Agency.  
The authority approved the Grid Code on June 9, 2005, which was 
circulated to all stakeholders for enforcement and compliance. The distribution 
code for MEPCO, GEPCO, PESCO, HESCO, QESCO, and IESCO have also 
been approved. Guidelines on power Safety Code have also been approved by 
the a uthority for circulation to all generating, transmission and distribution 
companies, which will submit their respective power safety codes to NEPRA for 
approval.  
 
3.3.4. Privatisation  
Privatisation as such is not directly the function or responsibility of the 
NEPRA. But NEPRA has to facilitate the process to bring efficiency in the 
power sector and helps in ensuring competition where feasible. The privatisation 
process started at a slow speed. Kot Addu Power Plant (1638 MW) was the first 
to be privatised in 1996. Initially 26 percent of the shares were transferred to the 
private owner, and then later on 10 percent more of the shares were transferred 
to the private owner. In December 2005 a majority stake (73 percent of shares) 
in KESC was sold to a private investor. It is the major step although the process 
took many years to materialise.
15 Next in line is the distribution company, 
                                                 
14Different tariffs being charged in Karachi are often criticised in the parliament [see Kiani 
(2006)].   




16 It is intended to sell 56 percent of its shared capital by the second 
quarter of 2006 but so far nothing has happened. It is because of the delay in the 
notification of the tariff approved by NEPRA. A multi year tariff has already 
been determined for JPC. All the short listed bidders for these companies, who 
had invested their time and money in carrying out the due hard work, are 
waiting for the resolution of the dispute between the Government and NEPRA. 
This is a major setback for the companies waiting for their privatisation.   
 
3.3.5.  Consumer Affairs 
NEPRA has established a consumer affairs division to address complaints 
lodged by the consumers against the utility companies. Various consumer 
complaint hearings have been held. According to the NEPRA Annual Reports, 
NEPRA is 100 percent successful in the redressal of complaints but according to 
the Consumer Rights version, NEPRA only deals with the complaints of 
industrial consumers and does not give weight to the complaints of domestic 
consumers.  Moreover, though penalties exist in the law for malpractices, yet 
there exist no clues under which the aggrieved could be entitled to compensation 
of any kind [Humayun and Anjum (2000)].  
NEPRA is also encouraging and assisting the provincial governments to 
prescribe rules for the redressal of complaints through provincial offices of 
inspection established under Section 38 of the NEPRA Act. Draft procedure has 
already been circulated to the provincial governments. The provincial 
governments of Balochistan, NWFP, and Sindh have notified their procedures.    
 
4. REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS OF NEPRA 
The reform process around the world put in forefront the issue of efficient 
regulatory system for the utility industries. The utility industries, in addition to 
being highly capital intensive, have irreversible investments. Hence, an effective 
institutional framework is necessary for sustained and efficient level of its 
output growth. It becomes even more important when private investment is 
involved. An independent regulatory institution, with a clearly defined legal 
framework is argued to be the solution for an effective institutional framework 
[Pachauri (2001) and Stern and Cubbin (2005)]. The quality of a regulatory 
agency is determined primarily by the quality of its governance. The economic 
literature has identified various governance characteristics for effective utility 
regulation [as discussed in section 2.3]. The analysis on the regulatory 
effectiveness of NEPRA is based on some of these governance characteristics.
17   
                                                 
16FESCO is one of the best distribution company in terms of its operational performance, 
which enjoys a low degree of distribution losses (10-13.5 percent) while d istribution losses to 
IESCO, GEPCO, LESCO, MEPCO, QESCO, PESCO, HESCO are 14.9 percent, 16 percent, 17.4 
percent, 22 percent, 22.5 percent, 31.4 percent, and 41.4 percent respectively. 
17Only secondary sources are used for the analysis.  
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4.1. Regulatory Autonomy 
Independent regulator can provide assurance to investors that prices, 
outputs and inputs will not come under the pressure of ‘regulatory capture’ and 
pressures from economic and political interest groups.
18 NEPRA is not 
autonomous (or independent), as the government continues to exercise 
considerable control over it in matters of tariffs and pricing. Undue interference 
and influence of the government hampers the independent functioning, which in 
turn affects the consumers as well as producers. The success of electricity 
restructuring in Argentina and Chile is attributed to a very large extent to the 
performance of their independent regulators [Stern (2000)]. However, Pachauri 
(2001) while talking about South Asia argued that some of the challenges 
existing in these counties are much bigger and complex. Most of these countries 
have emerged from colonial rule. Even in countries where this was not the case, 
the structure of society has often been characterised by major divisions, largely 
feudal in character. The class structure and the social forces that exist are 
therefore, different from those that have been seen in the countries of the North, 
which have practised democracy for several decades. As a result, in these 
developing countries, it is extremely difficult to have an independent regulator.  
They also need to be financially independent of the government. The 
independence of the regulator must be supported by sufficient funds; otherwise 
the regulator can be improperly influenced by cuts to its budgetary allocation, 
i.e., ‘political capture’. The most appropriate approach is levies charged from 
regulated services (license fee for regulated firms etc.).  The NEPRA operations 
are funded from licensing fees, filling fees etc. as prescribed by it from time to 
time and approved by the Federal Government.  The Auditor General of 
Pakistan audits the accounts o f the authority annually. However, there are 
instances where NEPRA compromised on its financial autonomy, e.g., WAPDA 
successor distribution companies who have been issued licenses delay the 
payment of fees (NEPRA Annual Report 2001-02),
19  allowing the government 
to submit only a token amount of Rs. 1000 for the disposal of its tariff petition 
[Humayun and Anjum (2000)].  This can have a negative impact on consumer’s 
confidence in the regulatory arrangement.   
 
4.2. Regulatory Expertise 
Inadequate regulatory (human capital) resources lead to poor decision-
making [Stern and Cubbin (2005)]. The key requirements for independence are the 
personal qualities of regulators that allow them to take independent decisions and 
resist improper pressure or incentives. Their technical knowledge, professional 
                                                 
18Interest groups tend to promote their own economic rents, for details on capture theory see 
Stigler (1971), Posner (1974) and Peltzman (1976, 1989).   
19The information of whether they pay afterwards is not available.  
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expertise, and institutional capacity to discharge its responsibilities count a lot. In 
addition, to prevent comeback from the affected parties, regulators must be 
appointed for fixed terms and protected from arbitrary removal.  
NEPRA has also problems in that sense. Power has used to be a 
provincial rather than a federal subject in Pakistan, therefore NEPRA comprises 
of nominees from the bureaucracy of the four provincial governments and now, 
a former military person is the chairman. All are appointed by the government. 
None of the members has the requisite professional background and relevant 
experience in a power sector regulatory framework. They are mostly retired 
bureaucrats, and serve only for a short period in NEPRA.
20  By the time, the 
regulator (member) may develop some understanding of the complexities of the 
sector his tenure is over. The selection for a new regulator often involves long 
delays. That’s why sometimes NEPRA is without Chairman (in 2002-03), and 
sometimes without members (in 2005).
21  This affects the smooth and effective 
functioning of the authority. NEPRA has not been able to develop expertise in 
relevant areas that could have facilitated effective interventions in the future. In 
addition, NEPRA has also not acquired the services of a professional support 
staff in a transparent manner that could establish a proper regulatory framework 
for the benefit of the consumers and producers alike. Most of the existing 
professional staff of NEPRA are ex-WAPDA employees with no exposure to 
regulatory concepts and functions or are drawn from the sectors, which have no 
relevance to the operational requirements of a power utility [Nizam (2003)]. 
There are no energy economists in NEPRA,
22 therefore optimal tariff 
calculation, a complicated area, remains unexplored [Bari (2006)]. This may be 
the reason that the government has turned down a number of NEPRA’s 
regulatory decisions, or simply not being implemented by the entities being 
regulated (WAPDA and KESC). There are occasions where WAPDA and KESC 
are not satisfied with NEPRA on the subject of tariff determination [Chaudhry 
(2002)]. But on the other hand, NEPRA is also found obliging WAPDA without 
any justification under Government pressure [Humayun and Anjum (2000)].  
 
4.3.  Accountability 
Independence of the regulator needs to be compliant with measures to 
ensure that the regulator is accountable for its action. For accountability of the 
regulator, legislation should ensure  transparency of the decision-making 
process; detailed justifications of decisions; opportunities for all interested 
parties to take part in public hearings; and provisions for the removal of 
regulators in case of the proven misconduct or incapacity. Proper checks and 
                                                 
20The retirement age in bureaucracy is 60 years, while in NEPRA it is 65 years. 
21To date NEPRA is without member from Sindh. 
22Nor in WAPDA [Bari (2006)].  
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balances can ensure that the regulator does not drift away from its mandate, 
engage in corrupt practices or become grossly inefficient. It is often argued that 
the IPPs controversy could have been avoided in Pakistan provided the 
procedures were followed in a transparent manner and by making all the 
relevant information available to the media and citizens. As the deals were kept 
secret, there were speculations of bribes; a crisis was thus created in the power 
sector with significant implications for the national economy and consumers. 
Accountability depends upon access to information and when information is 
denied to the public no accountability can be expected. The regulators are feared 
to have the tendency to come under the influence of corporate interests; 
therefore, their proceedings should be held in a transparent manner by involving 
all the stakeholders, particularly, the consumers in a meaningful way. 
 
4.4.  Participation 
As far as public participation is concerned, public hearings do take place 
in NEPRA (institutional arrangements are in place) but from the consumer point 
of view, little emphasis is given to ensure the quality of these hearings. 
Consumers are not allowed enough time to make their point or to examine the 
matter independently. Sometimes, they are not provided necessary documents, 
reports and data. Moreover, laws in NEPRA allow for a complete grievance 
redress mechanism, but it is meant for industrial consumers only while the 
domestic consumers are not properly entertained [Humayun and Anjum (2000)]. 
 
4.5.  Credibility  
In the optimal design of any regulatory institution, there is always a risk 
of organisational failure unless credibility and transparency in regulatory 
decisions are in place to counter organisational failures.  Independence, 
accountability and proficiency  of the energy regulators are crucial for 
credibility. Direct involvement by ministers in pricing and licensing decisions 
can undermine regulatory credibility, and hence investment. Smith (1997) notes 
the crucial importance of utility services in politics, e.g., electricity consumers 
as voters. For short-term political goals, politicians or parliamentarians turn 
down the justified increase in tariff
23 (as in the case of Pakistan separate tariff 
determinations for all DISCOs have been reserved) at the expense of long-term 
benefits of consumers and investments. Investors being aware of organisational 
risks associated with their investments will demand high tariffs (as what 
happened in the case of IPPs in Pakistan) to compensate for increased risk or 
they will invest in industries with independent regulatory agencies (with no 
government involvement). 
                                                 
23Because politicians are aware supply failures and sharply higher prices can provoke social 
unrest and their political future may get jeopardised.  
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4.6. Clarity of Roles 
Another issue highlighted by Jacob (2004) and Stern and Holder (1999) 
with reference to efficient regulatory mechanism is the clarity in the mission and 
roles of the regulator. In the case of Asian regulators Jacob (2004) observed 
many conflicting public policy missions. Government intervention and market 
competition go along together and are emphasised equally (so is in Pakistan). 
Another related issue (as discussed above) is the relevant expertise of the 
regulatory staff to define regulatory missions clearly and carry out the functions 
effectively. In the developing countries (including Pakistan) it is really difficult 
to find skills to staff regulatory institutions, to run new companies, and to 
provide for a policy capacity in the relevant ministries [Stern (2000)]. NEPRA 
has also realised the shortage of professional staff in the market with expertise in 
utility regulation.  
In Pakistan like in  many other Asian countries too many government 
entities are involved in the whole process of regulation [Appendix B (Table 1)]. 
Institutional simplification can improve the effectiveness of independent 
regulators [Jacobs (2004)].   
 
4.7.  Delays in Process 
One more institutional weakness in the regulatory framework is the delay 
in the regulatory processes. It is found that the cumbersome bureaucratic 
procedure and lack of administrative efficiency cause enormous delays in the 
case of Pakistan. Having multiple agencies (as mentioned earlier) involved in 
the sector is also a certain recipe for delays as it becomes necessary to get 
overall commitment (or approval) to required changes. For example, delay in the 
transfer of responsibilities from the government to the power regulator means 
ministers and civil servants giving up responsibilities they have exercised for 
many years.
24  In the case of NEPRA activities, for instance, the authority is 
quite successful in the issuance of licenses, however the process is slow. 
Similarly, performance standards and codes for different segments in the power 
industry have been finalised to some extent but again it took quite a long time.   
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
NEPRA was formed to protect consumer interests in the area of 
electricity provision, and to ensure an efficient and competitive environment for 
the electricity generators and distributors, but it has so far not been able to 
achieve anything. The power sector is still affected by institutional and 
organisational weaknesses. WAPDA and KESC are still the inefficient giants 
that they used to be as a result of a weak governance structure, with inefficient 
                                                 
24Creation of PEPCO (as a separate company of WAPDA) was delayed as some senior staff 
in WAPDA have personal interests in the delay of restructuring.   
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and non-optimal tariffs, high line losses, and high level of corruption. 73 percent 
shares in KESC have been transferred to the private owner, but nothing 
significant has come out so far.  
The tariff structure is not based on long run marginal cost but used as an 
instrument to achieve political objectives. There is no competition at the level of 
distribution. Unless all distribution c ompanies are made responsible for their 
finances and allowed to function independently, it would not be possible to 
bring in efficiency in the power sector because inefficient DISCOs like Quetta, 
Hyderabad, Peshawar, Tribal areas and Multan are being subsidised by some 
profit making DISCOs like Lahore, Islamabad, Faisalabad and Gujranwala. The 
government is delaying the announcement of separate tariffs for all corporate 
distribution companies despite separate determinations made by NEPRA. The 
Government finds separate tariffs as being a politically difficult decision to 
implement (an example of political capture). They find it difficult to defend if 
the tariff in Islamabad and in other cities in Punjab remains at the current level 
but increases in Balochistan, Sindh and NWFP (where distribution companies 
are making losses). They also fear the negative impact of a power tariff increase 
on the overall growth momentum and on inflation. This is also delaying the 
process of corporatisation of WAPDA and the power sector reforms programme, 
as none of its companies could be privatised despite continued efforts unless the 
tariff issue is resolved. The Government on the other hand, is thinking of 
reducing the role of NEPRA in tariff setting, given the disagreement between 
NEPRA and PPIB on the tariff issues [Kiani (2006)].  
Controlling state-owned enterprise is the most difficult challenge in 
Pakistan;
25 incomplete privatisation (or limited private participation), substantial 
state ownership and above all the same ministry interfering in regulatory matters 
that also oversee the performance of the sate-owned enterprise. A regulator 
cannot resolve this conflict of roles, especially when so many government 
entities are involved in the regulatory process. 
It is NEPRA and the government (as a facilitator) both who have to 
ensure that market conditions are met. The government still assumes many 
risks that should be borne by private firms.
26  These problems undermine any 
credible regulation of a competitive market, regardless of the regulators 
capacities.  The main reason for the poor performance of the regulator is that 
the external environment of structural, policy and governance reforms 
remains extremely difficult. Structural problems such as market abuses and 
control of networks and essential facilities have damaged many liberalisation 
initiatives [Jacobs (2004)]. 
                                                 
25Not only in Pakistan, all post socialist countries with limited tradition of independent 
public institutions, limited regulatory experience and capacity. 
26For instance, the objective of IPPs is to make money. They are still enjoying too many 
concessions in Pakistan [Bari (2006)].  
 
21 
Weak administrative governance in NEPRA in the form of lack of 
autonomy has resulted in the overall institutional inability to carry out the 
desired functions effectively. In addition, may be NEPRA is not competent 
enough (in terms of professional expertise) to supervise and control the power 
sector and establish a rational and equitable pricing regime. Or there may be 
some deficiency in the overall regulatory structure  as highlighted by Laffont 
(1996)
27 when infrastructure reforms were introduced in developing and 
transition economies, many of them had little experience to guide the design of 
regulatory mechanisms. Under pressure from multilateral institutions and 
international donors, many of these countries hastily adopted a regulatory model 
from the developed countries. These models were hardly modified to the 
political and institutional characteristics in these economies including lack of 
checks and balances, limited technical expertise, weak auditing, accounting and 
tax systems, and widespread corruption and regulatory capture. This is what 
seems to be happening in Pakistan. 
But as Stern and Cubbin (2005), while concluding their survey of 
literature on the effectiveness of regulatory institutions, are of the view that 
regulatory institutions with good governance have the tendency to make fewer 
mistakes. In addition, they have the ability to identify mistakes and correct them 
quickly to establish a good regulatory practice. The secret of the spectacular 
success of Asian countries like Malaysia and South Korea and China also lies in 
good governance, with a proper system of checks and balances. Independent 
regulation in the true sense can play an important role in maximising the welfare 
of people and improvement in the efficiency of energy enterprises. Rigorous 
analysis and intellectual efforts can lead to a new paradigm of regulation and the 
rise of governance structures with reference to the local conditions of the 
developing countries [Pachauri (2001)].    
In Pakistan, a regulatory agency with good governance is needed. All the 
governance attributes are interrelated and equally important. This is a necessary 
condition but not a sufficient condition for improving the overall performance of the 
sector. It should be accompanied by a well-designed industry and market structures. 






                                                 





REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Table A.1 
Studies on Regulatory Experience 
Authors  Methodology  Main Findings/Messages 
Cook (1999)  Review of Case Studies 
from Developing Countries. 
Limited government capacity to 
enforce regulatory rules. 
Encourage competition at a slow 
pace. 
Jamas (2002)  Review of Case Studies 
from Developing Countries. 
When designing reforms 
institutional capacity in the 
country and sector’s systematic 
features should be taken in 
account. Redefined role of the 
state rather than a complete 
withdrawal from the sector. 
Dubash (2005)  Review of institutional and 
governance structure of 
Regulatory bodies in India, 
Philippines, Thailand and 
Indonesia. 
Governance Characteristics of 
regulatory agencies crucial for 
social policy concerns. 
Estache and 
Romero (1999) 
Used CGE to estimate the 
macroeconomic and 
distributional impact of 
privatisation and regulation 
of utilities in Argentina. 
Beneficial impact of effective 
regulation of newly privatised 
utilities on all classes of society. 
Zhang, et al. 
(2002) 
Using panel data for 51 
developing countries 
assessed the effects of 
privatisation, competition 
and regulation on the 
performance of electricity 
generation industry.  
Effective role of competition in 
stimulating performance 
improvements, irrespective of 




Empirically assessed 28 
developing countries for 
regulatory law and higher 
quality regulatory 
governance association with 
electricity outcomes. 
Regulatory law and higher 
quality governance positively and 
significantly affect per capita 
generation capacity levels. This 
impact will be for at least three 
and probably for ten years as 
experience develops and 





Pargal (2003)  Assesses the importance of 
the regulatory framework for 
private sector investment in 
infrastructure.  
An increase in regulatory 
certainty and a decrease in the 
perceived risk of expropriation 
through the establishment of 
independent regulatory bodies is 
a critical determinant of the 
volume of private investment.  
Jalilian, et al. 
(2003) 
Explores the role of 
regulatory governance in 
effecting economic 
outcomes using an 
econometric model. 
Strong link between regulatory 
quality and economic 
performance. Weakness in public 
policy is a contributing factor to 
the limited impact of reforms. 
Stern (2000)  Survey of evidence from 
Latin America, Asia and Sub 
Saharan Africa in telecom 
and electricity industries. 
Sustainability and success of the 
reform process depends on the 
establishment of effective and 
autonomous regulatory 
institutions. Educational 
infrastructure very important for 
regulatory agencies.  
Tsaplin (2001)   Empirically tested the 
Ukrainian energy regulatory 
system for compliance with 
criteria of good regulation.  
Significant deficiencies in the 
regulatory system. Reasons being 
incomplete and improper 
specification of legislative 
framework of the regulatory 
bodies; and lack of coordination 
between the development of 
constitution, administrative and 
regulatory reform.  
Aryeetey and 
Ahene (2005) 
Case study of three public 
utilities (water, electricity 
and telecommunication) in 
Ghana.  
Lack of regulatory experts; non-
cooperation by some key industry 
actors; and lack of sufficient 
funding hampered the regulatory 
reform process. 
Steiner (2000)  Empirically evaluates the 
impact of liberalisation and 
privatisation on the 
performance of generation in 
the electricity supply 
industry in OECD. 
Significant impact of unbundling 
of generation, private ownership, 
expanded access to transmission 
networks, and the introduction of 






Rao (2002)  Case Study of electricity 
regulation in India. 
Regulators have inadequate and 
inaccurate technical and financial 
information. Government is 
supporting utilities. Regulators 
and their staff tend to be people 
drawn from government service 
thus lack fresh thinking or 
independence from government 
practices. Delays in 
implementation of much needed 
changes. 
Kennedy (2003)  Survey of regulations in the 
power sector of transition 
economies. Focus on two 
dimensions of regulations: 
governance and content.  
Progress in regulatory reform. 
Regulatory independence, 
however, is limited. Regulatory 
rules are loosely specified, 
providing scope for political 
influence in tariff. In some cases 
well-written rules are not 
implemented in practice. When 
importing tariff mechanism from 
West theses should be adapted to 
reflect the specific characteristics 
of transition economies.   
Thomas (2001)  Reviewed the theory and 
practice in the British 
electricity industry since its 
reform in 1990. Key element 
in the UK reform process 
was the introduction of 
incentive regulation or      
RPI-X. 
Regulatory interventions have 
been found necessary to prevent 
the abuse of market power. Ideal 
industry structure with separate 
sets of companies operating in 
the four component parts of the 
industry has partially been 
achieved. The generation market 
in UK is competitive 
accompanied with transformed 
market mechanism, but it remains 
to be seen whether this will be 
sufficient to make generation 




APPENDIX B  
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN THE POWER SECTOR 
 
Table B.1 
Government Agencies and Their Responsibilities 
  Responsibilities 
Ministry of Water and 
Power 
Take care of the sector’s affairs and manage 
issues of energy policy. 
PPIB  To facilitate private investors in the power 
sector; provide guarantees on behalf of 
government; assists the regulatory authority in 
determining and approving tariffs; and also an 
implementing agency for power policy. 
NEPRA  To ensure fair competition and consumer protection. 
AEDB  To promote the exploitation of alternative 
energy resources such as small scale hydro 
plants, wind power and off grid generation 
plants. 
Privatisation Commission  Deals with privatisation issues.  
  
APPENDIX C  
POWER SECTOR PERFORMANCE IN PAKISTAN 
 
Table C.1 
Growth (1990-91 to 2004-05) 
Installed Capacity  5.4% 
Generation Capacity  5.1% 
Consumption  4.5% 
 
Although the growth in consumption is low as compared to its growth 
during the 1970s and 1980s (over 9 percent),
28 the state of per capita electricity 
consumption is even worse (grew at the rate of only 2.4 percent in this period). 
Per capita electricity consumption in Pakistan is extremely low as compared to 
other developing countries.
29 Almost half of the  population remains without 
access to electricity services. In 2004-05, consumption pattern by category is: 
domestic consumers (43.6 percent), commercial (6.5 percent), industrial 
(32.5 percent), agriculture (11 percent), public lighting (0.5 percent), and 
bulk supply and others (5.9 percent). 
                                                 
28Slow growth in consumption reflects T& D (transmission and distribution) losses. 
29In 2000-02, per capita consumption in Malaysia and Thailand were 2693 and 1589 
respectively, while for Pakistan it was 344.   
 
26 
Safe and reliable transmission and distribution of electricity remains a 
major problem in Pakistan. The situation of huge power losses (from 
transmission and distribution networks and auxiliaries consumption) over the 
years has hardly improved. It was 23.4 percent of units generated in 1990-91, 
and then peaked in 1999-2000 at 30.4 percent, and is at 28.4 percent in 2004-
05
30 (Figure 1).  
 



























These are exceptionally high compared to other Asian countries.
32  These 
losses are also argued to be due to unreliable and old-age generation plants, low-
voltage transmission and distribution lines, weak grid infrastructure as well as its 
inappropriate location, some commercial factors such as inaccurate metering and 
billing, default payments, un-metered supplies, and theft from illegal connections 
[AEDB (2005) and Ghafoor and Weiss (1999)]. All the commercial factors are 
basically due to a weak governance structure in the power sector [Shah (2002)]. 
 
Table C.2 
Liabilities on the Federal Budget (Rs in Billion)
33 
                                                 
30Data is not consistent in different government sources, an example of information asymmetry.  
31Source: CEE Report (2004-05) 
32In 2001-02, T&D losses of WAPDA were at 23.6  percent and KESC at 41 percent 
compared to 10-12 percent in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. 
33Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2005-06. 
  2003-04  2004-05  2005-06 
WAPDA’s Subsidy  15.6  26.56  33.21 
WAPDA’s Non-recovery of Loans  21.0  21.61  6.40 
WAPDA’s New Loans  2.6  3.60  3.60 
KESC’s Equity  –  9.20  0.39 
KESC’s Subsidy against an Adjustment 
of Additional Surcharge against GST  1.5  2.20  2.66 


























On the financial side, the sector is facing a series of problems over the 
last 15 years. WAPDA and KESC have been the largest drain on the budget in 
the form of subsidies or non-payment of loans, etc. (see Table 2). WAPDA is a 
significantly large company as compared to KESC, but in terms of performance 
it is relatively better. It has made financial losses in a number of recent years, 
but never exceeded 11 percent of its revenue. Significant losses in 2004-05 are 
attributed to increasing fuel prices and unchanged tariffs. KESC, which used to 
make profits until 1994-95 is facing huge financial losses every year. In 2001-02 
and 2003-04, losses were more than the 50 percent of total revenues [Parish 
(2006)]. The reasons are technical as well as commercial and are attributed to 




Another issue is current tariff levels and structures involving significant 
cross subsidies, from industrial and commercial consumers to agricultural and 
small (under 50 kWh per month) domestic consumers. Although tariff increase 
for domestic and agriculture consumers exceeded that for the CPI (consumer 
price index), and other consumer categories in the period from 1991 to 2005, 
limited progress has been made in reducing cross-subsidies. The largest 
percentage increase in the revenue collected per kWh occurred in the agriculture 
sector, followed by the domestic sector. The revenues collected in these two 
sectors are still considerably lower than for other consumers, and less than one-
half of those for commercial users. In this period from 1991 to 2005, the rate of 
power tariff increase outstripped inflation (for details Table 3 below). 
While tariff charged to the domestic consumers is cross-subsidised from 
industrial and commercial consumers, the share of electricity sold to domestic 
consumers has increased from 31.6 percent in 1988-89 to 43.6 percent in 2004-05. 
This subsidised category has created an additional burden on the financial position 
of public utilities. The sector also receives overall subsidies in the form of both 
direct subsidies (to KESC) and the provision of free capital on which no return is 
expected (to both KESC and WAPDA) (as shown in Table 2). These will continue 
to be necessary so long as the tariff structure is not developed to cover costs.
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34Tariffs determined by NEPRA are not notified. 
Box C.1. Risk in Cross Subsidy 
The risk involved in a cross subsidy policy is that industrial (or 
commercial) consumers will seek power supplies from elsewhere as soon as 
they are able to do so to reduce their costs. Therefore, government has to 
decide a new subsidy policy to support small domestic and agricultural 




Nominal Tariff in Paisas per KWh 
Consumer Category  1991  1996  2000  2005  Growth (%) 
Domestic  63  136  233  319  11.4 
Commercial  217  537  703  724  8.4 
Industry  106  336  416  445  10.04 
Bulk Supply  148  295  406  523  8.8 
Agriculture  43  131  231  311  14.1 
Average  115  287  398  393  8.5 
 
Real Tariff in Paisas Adjusted for CPI, 2000 Base Year 
Consumer Category  1991  1996  2000  2005  Growth (%) 
CPI  45.5  77.8  100  128.5  7.2 
Domestic  139  175  233  248  3.9 
Commercial  477  690  703  563  1.1 
Industry  233  432  416  346  2.7 
Bulk Supply  325  379  406  407  1.5 
Agriculture  95  168  231  242  6.4 
Average  254  369  398  361  2.4 
Source:  Kojima (2006), Malhotra, et al. (1994), FESCO Report (2006) and International Financial 
Statistics (Various Issues). 
 
WAPDA generates about 60 percent of the country’s electricity, while 
KESC provides about 12 percent; the rest comes from IPP’s and other sources. 
The losses of these companies are so huge that subsidising them each year is an 
enormous burden on the federal budget. There is a lot of resistance to privatising 
these companies. Given the lack of funds, supply is also lagging behind demand 
that is increasing at the rate of 7 percent per year, and the gap is going to 
increase in the years to come (Figure 2).  
 




                                                 




The increase in the demand however, is an indication of the expansion in 
the Pakistan economy. Both demand projections as well as international 
experience have suggested that power demand is likely to grow faster than the 
economy in the years to come [Parish (2006)].  
Growth in demand suggests that substantial investment will be needed to 
maintain continuity of supplies. Not only in generation, the most capital 
intensive segment in the sector, investments are also needed in the transmission 
and distribution sectors to overcome the huge losses the sector is suffering for 
the last couple of years. Providing adequate supply requires mobilising much 
more private investment. The quality of the regulatory environment is very 
important for the investor’s confidence.  
 
APPENDIX D 
NEPRA MAIN FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
It includes: 
• Issuing of licensing for generation, transmission and distribution of 
electric power. 
• Enforcement of quality standards and ensuring of safety in the 
operation and supply of electricity to consumers. 
• Determine tariffs for generation, transmission and distribution of 
electric power.   
• Approving the investment and power acquisition programmes of the 
utility companies.  
• Setting fees for licenses and its renewal, fines for breaking the rules.  
• Setting a uniform system of accounts for generation, transmission and 
distribution companies. 
• Setting and reviewing the performance standards of all companies. 
• Inform government about the activities of power companies.  
• Encourage uniform industry standards and code of conduct for 
generation, transmission and distribution companies. 
• Tender advice to public sector projects. 
• Report to the federal government on all activities relating to generation, 
transmission and distribution. 
• Perform any other function incidental or consequential of the above-
mentioned responsibilities.    
 
APPENDIX E  
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR TARIFF DETERMINATIONS 
According to Section 17, NEPRA Tariff Standards and Procedures Rules 
1998, tariffs will be determined in accordance with the following standards:  
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• Tariffs should allow licensee the recovery of all costs. It may not 
require to assess the licensee where tariffs are set on other than cost of 
service basis, such as formula based tariffs that are designed to be in 
place for mo re than one year; 
• Tariffs should generally be calculated by including a depreciation 
charge and rate of return on the capital investment of each licensee 
equal to that earned by other investments of comparable risk; 
• Tariff should allow a rate of return which promotes continued 
reasonable investment in equipment and facilities for improved and 
efficient service; 
• The mechanism of tariff should allow licensee a benefit as well as 
penalty in case of failure to provide the service and the quality of 
service;  
• Tariffs should reflect marginal cost principles to the extent feasible, 
keeping in view the financial stability of the sector; the preference of 
the authority is for competition rather than regulation therefore, tariff 
policies should be directed towards that end; 
• The tariff regime should clearly identify interclass and inter-region 
subsidies and provide such subsidies transparently if found essential, 
with a view to minimising if not eliminating them, keeping in view the 
need for an adequate transition period; 
• Tariffs may be set below the level of cost of providing the service to 
consumers consuming electric power below the consumption levels 
determined for the purpose from time to time by the authority, as long 
as such tariffs are financially sustainable; 
• Tariffs should reflect the full cost of service to consumers groups with 
similar service requirements; 
• Tariffs should take into account government subsidies or the need for 
adjustment to finance rural electrification in accordance with the 
policies of the government;  
• The application of the tariffs should allow reasonable transition periods 
for the adjustments of tariffs to meet the standards and other 
requirements including the performance standards, industry standards 
and the uniform codes of conduct; 
• Tariffs should seek to provide stability and predict ability for 
customers; and 
• Tariff should be comprehensible, free of misinterpretation and shall 
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